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In this study we examine the complementary monitoring activity that takes place via the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) and its effect on security analyst monitoring activity and firm value of large and small public 
firms. Our findings indicate that security analyst monitoring activity has decreased post-SOX while firm 
value has increased post-SOX for both large and small firms. We also find that the increase in firm value 
is more pronounced for the group of small firms. Given these results, we surmise that the complementary 
monitoring activity provided by SOX is effective enough to have a positive impact on firm value. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial markets thrive on good information, and the more accurate the information, the more 
efficiently these markets function. Academicians and practitioners agree that security analysts play a very 
important role as information intermediaries in the financial markets. They collect and analyze 
information obtained from corporate managers, and present it in a form that is easy to understand. In turn, 
both individual and institutional investors, brokers, and other market participants use that information in 
making investment decisions. Thus, there is general consensus that security analysts make a key 
contribution in ensuring the informational efficiency of the financial markets by increasing the 
information set of investors. 
The monitoring role played by security analysts is an essential and equally important one. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) postulate that security analysts’ role as monitoring agents is significant, especially when 
agency problems exist. It has been shown that monitoring activity can curtail managers’ ability to obtain 
both non-pecuniary and pecuniary benefits from shareholders. Moreover, bondholders find monitoring 
activity by security analysts effective in helping to prevent risk shifting from shareholders to bondholders. 
In essence, the authors highlight the monitoring activities of security analysts as a means of reducing 
agency costs in public firms created by the separation of ownership and control.  
Another potential impact of security analyst monitoring activity is the positive effect on corporate 
value. Indeed, Jensen and Meckling (1976) surmise that one of the primary advantages of security analyst 
monitoring activity is the higher firm value which shareholders enjoy. Additionally, Chung and Jo (1996) 
find that security analyst monitoring functions lead to a “significant and positive impact on firms’ market 
value.” Doukas et al. (2000) also find that security analyst monitoring activity serves to reduce agency 
costs, thereby curtailing misconduct by managers. Given that security analysts play a key role in 
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broadening the information set of investors and other market players, as well as reducing agency costs, it 
can be posited that there is a positive relationship between the level of security analyst monitoring activity 
and firm value. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (hereafter SOX) was implemented after a series of high-profile 
corporate scandals, which included bankruptcies, inadequate accounting practices, and inefficient audit 
firms that chose to ignore these practices. At the core of SOX is the improvement in the quality of 
financial reporting and corporate governance and, by extension, the restoration of investors’ confidence in 
the financial markets. SOX forces public companies to be more vigilant and transparent in their business 
activities, particularly in financial reporting. To this end, SOX mandates a number of rules and 
regulations: (1) chief executive officers and chief financial officers of all public firms must certify the 
accuracy of the financial statements; (2) audit committees must be independent; (3) there must be 
established procedures in place to assess the firm’s internal controls; and (4) there must be increased 
oversight of audit firms.1 Therefore, corporate managers and insiders are held to extremely high 
standards, and the fines and penalties for noncompliance with the requirements of SOX are severe.  
Many years have passed since SOX was implemented, and it is still unclear whether SOX is 
achieving its objectives. Specifically, its ultimate impact on the U.S. financial markets is still being 
debated. The literature examining the impact of SOX on various aspects of the financial markets has 
produced conflicting results. For example, Coates (2007) finds that there has been increased trust in the 
U.S. financial markets as a result of the implementation of SOX. On the other hand, Engel, Hayes and 
Wang (2007) find that there has been an increase in firms going dark post-SOX. Moreover, Zhang (2007) 
and Jain and Rezaee (2006) find a negative impact on firms as a result of SOX. Piotroski and Srinivasan 
(2008) study listing preferences of foreign firms post-SOX, and find that although large firms are still 
inclined to list on U.S. exchanges, the number of smaller firms seeking to list in the U.S. has decreased. 
We address the following question: What effect has SOX had on security analyst monitoring activity 
and firm value? If SOX is indeed meeting the objectives as set out in the rules and regulations, then there 
should be a positive impact as a result of additional monitoring activity and, by extension, firms should 
enjoy an increase in value. If, on the other hand, the rules and regulations are more superficial than 
substantial, then there should not be any real effect on monitoring activity and firm value. In addition, the 
impact on large firms may be different from the impact on small firms since prior research has concluded 
that firm size is positively related to analyst following ((Barth et al., (2001) and Bradley et al., (2003)). In 
other words, there is less security analyst monitoring activity associated with small firms. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that monitoring activity also takes place directly through the 
restrictive covenants that are inherent in bonds. This type of monitoring may not be perfectly equivalent 
to security analyst monitoring activity, but may be additional to security analyst monitoring. In fact, 
Moyer et al. (1989) and Chung and Jo (1996) document a negative relationship between the debt ratio and 
security analyst monitoring activity as a result of the monitoring activity that takes place through bond 
covenants. 
We define complementary monitoring activity as the additional monitoring activity that takes place 
outside of the traditional avenues such as security analyst monitoring activity, and the monitoring activity 
provided by financial institutions. For example, bond covenants can be deemed a form of complementary 
monitoring activity since they act as a monitoring mechanism outside the normal monitoring activity 
provided by security analysts and financial institutions. Using this theory, we conjecture that the 
components of SOX provide complementary monitoring activity by acting as restrictive covenants on the 
operations of public companies. Thus, the traditional positive relationship between analyst following and 
firm value may indeed break down post-SOX since the legislation provides an additional element of 
monitoring activity. Therefore, even though there may be an increase in firm value post-SOX, the level of 
security analyst monitoring may not necessarily increase because of the additional monitoring role 
provided by the components of SOX. 
The following section of the paper provides the hypotheses. Then the data sample, descriptive 
statistics, and methodology are presented followed by the empirical results. In the final section, we 
present our conclusions. 
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HYPOTHESES 
 
Three hypotheses are investigated. The first hypothesis is that security analyst monitoring activity 
(the number of analysts that cover a firm is used as the proxy) has decreased post-SOX. Lang et al. (2003) 
infer that superior corporate governance plays a significant role in whether security analysts follow 
particular firms. The better the corporate governance in a firm, the higher the analyst following. Using 
this inference, and to the extent that the provisions of SOX are creating better corporate governance and 
producing more accurate financial reporting, one would expect an increase in security analyst monitoring 
activity during the post-SOX period. However, if the legislation itself is acting as a complementary 
monitoring mechanism, in much the same way that bond covenants do, the level of analyst monitoring 
activity could actually decrease post-SOX even while an increase in firm value is realized. 
The second hypothesis is that firm value (proxied by Tobin’s q) has increased post-SOX. 
Cchaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that SOX has had a significant effect on firm value. Specifically, 
they find that firms that are less compliant with SOX earn positive abnormal returns compared to firms 
that are more compliant. Other research concludes that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between security analyst monitoring activity and firm value (Chung and Jo (1996)). The research also 
concludes that a higher level of monitoring activity, whether it is provided directly by security analysts 
and financial institutions, or indirectly by restrictive covenants and/or legislation (complementary 
monitoring activity), leads to higher firm value. Therefore, if overall monitoring activity has increased 
post-SOX, it is reasonable to expect that firm value has likewise increased. 
The third hypothesis examines security analyst monitoring activity and firm value within the context 
of firm size. We hypothesize that the effect of SOX on security analyst monitoring activity and firm value 
for small firms will be different from the effect on large firms. Prior research (Gao, Wu and Zimmerman, 
2009) suggests that SOX has increased the incentives for smaller firms to remain small. Moreover, 
Wintoki (2007) finds that “one size fits all” governance regulation may be bad for certain firms, 
especially young, small, growth firms operating in uncertain business environments. Other research 
suggests that small firms are more prone to having poor corporate governance and ineffective internal 
control systems than large firms (Doyle et al. (2007)). As a result, these small firms are faced with less 
analyst following than large firms. On that basis, we expect that there will be a difference in security 
analyst monitoring activity and firm value between large and small firms post-SOX. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data Description and Sample Selection 
Stock price data are obtained from CRSP, earnings forecast data are obtained from I/B/E/S, and 
company financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT. The time period under review is from January 
1996 to December 2006. Since SOX was implemented on July 25, 2002, the pre-SOX period was deemed 
to be 1996-2002, while the post-SOX period includes the years 2003 to 2006. We use 2003 as the 
beginning of the post-SOX period as companies were given about four months to conform to the 
requirements of the new legislation. We use 2006 as the end of the post-SOX period so that our results 
will not be influenced by the recent financial crisis, which began in 2007. The firms used in the study 
come from the S&P 500 Index and the S&P Small Cap 600 Index, and include only those firms that have 
a December fiscal year end. We use the firms in these two indexes to get an immediate view of the impact 
of SOX on these two firm categories. 
Following Moyer et al. (1989) and Chung and Jo (1996), the number of earnings forecasts made by 
the security analysts of a particular firm’s stock is used as the proxy for the level of security analyst 
monitoring activity. For each firm, the number of security analysts making one-year ahead earnings 
forecasts was obtained. Firms being followed by a single security analyst were dropped from the sample 
since it would be impossible to calculate the dispersion of the analyst forecasts. Dispersion of analyst 
forecast data was obtained from I/B/E/S along with SOXual earnings per share (EPS) data. Consistent 
with McConnell and Servaes (1990), Tobin’s q is used as the proxy for firm value. It is measured as 
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follows: Tobin’s q = (market value of equity + assets – book value of equity) / assets. Data obtained from 
COMPUSTAT were used to compute Tobin’s q, the debt ratio, advertising ratio, R&D ratio, return to 
capital, and an alternative measure of firm size based on the book value of assets. Stock price and return 
variance data were obtained from CRSP. Firms with missing data from these three databases were 
dropped from the sample. 
The final sample consists of 4,642 observations, representing 422 firms. Of these firms, 230 are from 
the S&P 500 Index and 192 are from the S&P Small Cap Index. Approximately 37 percent of the 
observations are during the post-SOX period, and 46 percent of the observations represent small firms.  
 
Methodology 
Chung and Jo (1996) highlight the endogenous nature of security analyst following in their analysis 
of the impact of analyst monitoring activity on firm value. The authors note that increased analyst 
following causes an increase in firm value (Tobin’s q); however, they also conjecture that firm value 
could in turn impact the number of analysts following a firm as more analysts may be motivated to follow 
high-value firms. Against this background, the following simultaneous equation system is used to 
empirically represent the association among firm value (q), security analyst monitoring activity (NAN), 
and a number of control variables post-SOX. The model defined in equations 1 and 2 represents a case of 
simultaneity, which occurs when there is a feedback association between one or more of the independent 
variables and the dependent variable.2 Simultaneity causes the OLS-estimated coefficients and standard 
errors to be biased. Therefore, to eliminate the simultaneity and consistent with Chung and Jo (1996), a 
three stage least squares (3SLS) regression is used to estimate the fixed effects panel data model 
presented below.3 
 
ln (NANit) = a0 + a1 ln (qit) + a2 (Debt Ratioit) + a3 (Advert Ratioit) + a4 (R&D Ratioit) + a5 
(1/Priceit) + a6 ln (Trading Volumeit) + a7 ln (Return Varianceit) + a8 ln (Firm Sizeit) + a9  
(SOXt) + uit   (1) 
 
ln (qit) = b0 + b1 ln (NANit)  + b2 (Debt Ratioit) + b3 (Advert Ratioit) + b4 (R&D Ratioit) + 
b5 ln (Dispersionit) + b6 ln (Shareholdersit) + b7 (Return to Capitalit) + b8 ln (Firm Sizeit) +  
b9 (SOXt) + uit  (2) 
 
The debt ratio (Debt Ratioit) is equal to the long-term debt divided by the total common equity at 
year-end. Moyer et al. (1989) postulate that the higher the level of debt in a firm’s capital structure, the 
more covenants that will be available to restrict a firm’s functions. In essence, the covenants act as a 
monitoring mechanism, and there is a reduced need for security analyst monitoring activity. Therefore, a 
negative relationship between the debt ratio and security analyst monitoring activity is expected. The 
relationship between firm value and the debt ratio is more complicated.4 If a firm is enjoying its optimal 
capital structure and the probability of financial distress is nonexistent, the tax benefits of debt will 
outweigh any costs and there will be a positive relationship between the debt ratio and firm value. On the 
other hand, if a firm has too much debt in its capital structure, then the risk of financial distress and 
bankruptcy increases leading to a decrease in firm value. 
The advertising ratio (Advert Ratioit) is equal to the annual advertising expenditure divided by annual 
sales. The R&D ratio (R&D Ratioit) is equal to annual R&D expenditure divided by annual sales. These 
two control variables are likely to exert a positive influence on security analyst following, as analysts 
would be more familiar with highly advertised firms. Likewise, more security analysts would follow 
firms with a high level of R&D expenditure since these firms are usually superior in terms of quality. 
Indeed, Chung and Jo (1996) find a positive and significant relationship between analyst following and 
these two variables. In terms of firm value, previous research (e.g., Hall (1993) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990)) finds a positive association between advertising and R&D expenditure and firm value. 
The yearly trading volume (Trading Volumeit) of each firm is calculated as the mean of the monthly 
dollar trading volume during each year. The return variance (Return Varianceit) is measured using the 
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monthly stock returns of each firm during the year. The share price (1/Priceit) for each firm is calculated 
using the midpoints of the bid and ask prices for each month, and then finding the average over the year. 
For a better model specification, and following Brennan and Hughes (1991), the reciprocal of the yearly 
share price is used. Consistent with Chung and Jo (1996), the book value of total assets is used as a proxy 
for firm size (Firm Sizeit). The sample is divided into quartiles and four categories of firm size are used. 
Quartile 1 represents the smallest firms while Quartile 4 represents the largest firms. Prior studies (e.g., 
Moyer et al. (1989), Bhushan (1989), and O’Brien and Bhushan (1990)) have found a positive 
relationship between security analyst monitoring activity and trading volume, return variance and firm 
size, and a negative relationship with share price. However, a negative association is found between firm 
value and firm size. 
The dispersion (Dispersionit) of security analyst forecasts for each firm is equal to the coefficient of 
variation of the security analyst forecasts for each year, and is a measure of risk. The return to capital 
(Return to Capitalit) for each firm is equal to net operating income divided by (total assets minus cash and 
investments). The number of shareholders (Shareholdersit) acts as a proxy for the investor base. In terms 
of firm value, previous research (e.g., McConnell and Servaes (1990)) has reported a negative relationship 
for dispersion and firm size, while a positive relationship is reported for return to capital and the number 
of shareholders. 
The variable SOXt is a dummy variable that equals one for the post-SOX period, and zero otherwise. 
Also, being cognizant of the fact that the SOX dummy variable could reflect alternative constructs other 
than ‘how SOX affected firms’, we include in the model macroeconomic several control variables that are 
unrelated to SOX, which may have an impact on the cost of equity capital. These variables include gross 
domestic product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI), producer price index (PPI) and real retail and food 
services sales (RETAIL).5 
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics separately for the overall sample and for the four size 
groups. Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the overall sample, while Panels B and C report 
descriptive statistics for the size groups. For each variable, the mean, median and standard deviation (SD) 
are reported. Panel A shows that the average firm value (Tobin’s q) for the entire sample is 2.10 and the 
average number of analysts is 12.24. The mean debt ratio is 0.82 and the mean number of shareholders is 
approximately 46,000. Panels B and C show that for the smallest firm size quartile (Q1), the mean 
number of security analysts following a firm is 5.34, while for the largest firm size quartile (Q4), the 
mean number of security analysts is 19.36. In terms of firm value, the smallest firms exhibited the highest  
 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SAMPLE (1996-2006) 
 
Panel A: All Firms 
Variable Mean Med SD 
NAN 12.24 11 8.38 
Tobin’s q 2.10 1.56 1.65 
Debt Ratio 0.82 0.46 7.83 
Advert Ratio 0.01 0 0.02 
R&D Ratio 0.08 0 0.57 
Share Price 36.40 32.37 22.18 
Dispersion 0.04 0.02 0.63 
Return Variance 7.73 1.06 34.80 
Trading Volume 14,136.01 3,485.54 39,240.72 
Return to Capital 0.06 0.06 0.18 
Firm Size 19,683.98 2,765.80 78,648.45 
Shareholders 45.73 8.26 162.60 
SOX 0.37 0 0.48 
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Panel B: Firms by Size(Quartiles 1 and 2) 
Variable         Mean     Med SD
  Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 
NAN 5.34 8.92 4 8 3.80 5.59
Tobin’s q 2.29 2.13 1.75 1.36 1.69 1.78
Debt Ratio 0.44 0.62 0.16 0.49 2.00 3.72
Advert Ratio 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.02 0.02
R&D Ratio 0.21 0.04 0 0 1.11 0.15
Share Price 20.64 32.67 18.14 30.17 13.61 18.28
Dispersion 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.49 0.85
Return Variance 2.33 3.39 0.50 0.95 4.12 4.97
Trading Volume 887.68 3673.04 366.45 1721.29 1554.30 6672.03
Return to Capital 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.34 0.06
Firm Size 352.63 1488.85 342.03 1350.93 175.65 602.11
Shareholders 3.86 7.86 1.65 3.63 5.33 11.73
SOX 0.26 0.39 0 0 0.44 0.49
 
Panel C: Firms by Size(Quartiles 3 and 4) 
Variable Mean Median SD
  Q3 Q4 Q3 Q4 Q3 Q4 
NAN 15.07 19.36 14 19 7.37 7.85 
Tobin’s q 2.00 1.99 1.63 1.53 1.68 1.41 
Debt Ratio 0.62 1.27 0.49 0.68 3.72 14.33
Advert Ratio 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.03 0.02 
R&D Ratio 0.03 0.03 0 0 0.06 0.06 
Share Price 41.70 50.06 39.49 47.52 19.90 23.79
Dispersion 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.76 
Return Variance 4.31 4.79 1.64 1.89 5.44 5.75 
Trading Volume 12305.05 38699.29 6152.30 18067.02 24209.05 67026.52
Return to Capital 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Firm Size 6027.18 70559.25 5516.92 26707.17 2491.37 145452.90
Shareholders 26.33 144.87 13 54.99 48.24 299.90
SOX 0.38 0.45 0 0 0.49 0.50 
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of number of analysts (NAN), Tobin’s q (market value of equity + 
assets – book value of equity)/assets, debt ratio (long-term debt/common equity), advertising ratio (advertising 
expenditure/total sales), R&D ratio (R&D expenditure/total sales), share price, dispersion (coefficient of variation of 
the consensus forecasts over the year), return variance (the variance of the monthly stock returns for each firm over 
the year), trading volume (the mean of the monthly dollar trading volume over the year), return to capital (net 
operating income/ (total assets - cash - investments)), firm size (book value of total assets), the number of 
shareholders, and the dummy variable SOX, which is equal to one if the forecast period is within the post-SOX 
period and zero otherwise. Firms are also put into quartiles depending on their level of total assets. Quartile 1 (Q1) 
represents the smallest firms while quartile 4 (Q4) represents the largest firms. In order to achieve better model 
specification, the reciprocal of price as well as the log of NAN, Tobin’s q, number of shareholders, trading volume, 
dispersion, and firm size are used in the regressions. The number of shareholders is reported in thousands, the 
trading volume is reported in thousands of dollars, and the firm size is reported in millions of dollars. 
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mean Tobin’s q (2.29), while the largest firms had a mean Tobin’s q of 1.99. This result is consistent with 
Chung and Jo (1996) who find that smallest firms have higher q ratios. In terms of the debt ratio, as 
expected, the smallest firms have the lowest mean debt ratio (0.44) compared to the mean debt ratio of the 
largest firms (1.27). 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This section reports the results on the effect of SOX on security analysts monitoring activity and firm 
value as defined in the structural model (equations 1 and 2). First, the impact of the legislation on analyst 
monitoring activity (or analyst following) is examined. Then, given the documented positive relationship 
between analyst following and firm value (Tobin’s q), the impact of the legislation on firm value is 
examined to determine whether that relationship has changed post-SOX. Finally, the effect on various 
firms (grouped by size) is investigated. 
 
Security Analyst Monitoring Activity 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results on the impact of SOX on security analyst monitoring activity. 
We hypothesize that security analyst monitoring activity has changed post-SOX. The tests are motivated 
by two main ideas: (1) Security analysts tend to follow firms that have high corporate value, better 
corporate governance systems, and are more transparent in their financial reporting and other corporate 
disclosure; and (2) the more covenants that govern/restrict a firm’s activities, the lower would be the 
demand for security analysts monitoring activity, ceteris paribus, because the covenants would essentially 
be acting as a additional monitoring mechanism. 
As expected, Panel A shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between security 
analyst monitoring activity and firm value. Specifically, for every one percent increase in the firm value, 
the results show that analyst monitoring activity (analyst following) increases by 0.5213 percent. 
However, the results further suggest that security analyst monitoring has decreased post-SOX providing 
empirical support for the conjecture that the legislation acts similar to a bond covenant restricting public 
firms’ activities, thereby diminishing the need for security analyst monitoring. The coefficient on SOX is 
negative and highly significant (t-statistic = -8.51). 
Consistent with previous research (Moyer et al. (1989)), the results show a negative and significant 
association between the debt ratio and analyst following. Also, the results indicate security analyst 
monitoring activity is positively and significantly associated with the R&D ratio, trading volume, and 
firm size. However, no statistical significance was found between analyst monitoring activity and the 
advertising ratio, share price and the variance of returns. 
 
Firm Value 
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results on the effect of SOX on firm value. It is hypothesized that firm 
value has increased post-SOX. Consistent with this study’s earlier findings, the results indicate a positive 
and significant relationship between firm value and analyst following (t-statistic = 5.01). However, the 
results show that firm value has increased post-SOX (t-statistic = 4.49) despite the earlier finding of a 
decrease in analyst following post-SOX. This corroborates the conjecture that the legislation is indeed 
playing a monitoring role. There is no vacuum created by the decrease in security analyst monitoring 
activity because of the monitoring mechanism called SOX. Therefore, it is no surprise that this study 
finds an increase in the firm value alongside a decrease in analyst following post-SOX because the 
legislation essentially provides a level of monitoring activity. 
The results also indicate a positive and significant association between firm value and the debt ratio, 
the R&D ratio, and the number of shareholders (i.e., the investor base). Consistent with previous research, 
the results show a negative and significant relationship between firm value and firm size, as well as the 
dispersion of analyst forecasts. No significant association was reported between firm value and the 
advertising ratio or the return to capital. 
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TABLE 2 
3SLS REGRESSION OF SECURITY ANALYST MONITORING AND FIRM VALUE 
 
Panel A: Security Analyst Monitoring Activity(NAN) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics 
ln (q) 0.5213 6.36*** 
Debt Ratio -0.0526 -2.92*** 
Advert Ratio 1.490 1.39 
R&D Ratio 1.959 3.04*** 
1/Share Price 0.0653 0.15 
ln (Return Variance) 0.004 1.50 
ln (Trading Volume) 0.053 2.82*** 
ln (Firm Size) 1.490 10.21*** 
SOX -0.1127 -8.51*** 
Adjusted R2 0.14   
 
Panel B: Firm Value (Tobin’s q) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics 
ln (NAN) 3.533 5.01*** 
Debt Ratio 0.2065 2.63*** 
Advert Ratio 6.055 1.57 
R&D Ratio 0.4481 12.44*** 
ln (Dispersion) -0.0976 -3.50*** 
ln (Shareholders) 0 .216 3.27*** 
Return to Capital 0.6309 0.58 
ln (Firm Size) -0.7261 -5.09*** 
SOX 0.4286 4.49*** 
Adjusted R2 0.16   
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level in two-tailed tests. 
 
Firm Size 
The results on the impact of SOX on security analyst monitoring activity and firm value by firm size 
are presented in Table 3. The hypothesis is that the impact of SOX on security analyst monitoring activity 
and firm value post-SOX for small firms will be different from the impact on large firms. Panel A shows 
the results for quartile 1, which represents the smallest firms based on the book value of assets. A positive 
and significant two-way relationship is reported between firm value and security analyst following. 
Moreover, the results show an increase in firm value (t-statistic = 2.83) and a decrease in analyst 
following (t-statistic = -3.05) post-SOX. Again, the results lend empirical support to the hypothesis that 
the legislation plays a monitoring role, which lessens the need for security analyst monitoring activity 
even among the smallest group of firms. In this quartile, the findings also show that analyst following is 
positively and significantly associated with only firm size and trading volume. In terms of firm value, 
there is a positive and significant relationship with return to capital, but a negative and significant 
relationship with dispersion and firm size. 
The results for quartile 2 are presented in Panel B. The results are consistent with the previous 
findings in this study. Security analyst following and firm value are positively and significantly 
associated. However, the increase in firm value post-SOX occurs in tandem with a decrease in security 
analyst following, reflecting the findings of the firms in quartile 1. Looking at the other variables, security 
analyst following is positively and significantly associated with the share price, return variance, trading 
volume, and firm size, and firm value is negatively associated with firm size. 
Journal of Applied Business and Economics vol. 14(1) 2013     93
The results for quartile 3 are presented in Panel C and are in agreement with the other findings. A 
two-way positive and significant relationship is reported between firm value and security analyst 
following. As expected, a decrease in security analyst following is reported, alongside an increase in firm 
value post-SOX. It should be noted here that in this quartile representing the larger firms, the increase in 
firm value (0.03 percent) is less than the increase in firm value in quartiles 1 and 2 (0.13 percent and 0.22 
percent, respectively). The difference is statistically significant suggesting that SOX has indeed been 
more beneficial to smaller firms. The results also show a negative and significant association between 
analyst following and the debt ratio, and a positive and significant association between analyst following 
and the advertising ratio, R&D ratio, trading volume and firm size. In terms of the firm value, findings 
indicate a positive and significant relationship with the advertising ratio, return to capital, and firm size. 
Quartile 4 (Panel D) represents the largest firms, and the findings are similar to what has been 
presented. A decrease in security analyst monitoring activity is recorded post-SOX. However, the increase 
in firm value post-SOX is 0.06 percent, which is significantly less than the increase in firm value for the 
smaller firms in quartiles 1 and 2. This finding provides empirical support to the postulation put forth by 
Kamar et al. (2007) highlighting the potential benefits to small firms as a result of implementing the 
various components of SOX. The authors suggest that as a result of the legislation, small firms (usually 
characterized by poor internal control systems) will become more efficient because of increased 
accountability, stricter internal control systems and financial reporting. In terms of the other variables, the 
findings for this quartile of firms indicate a positive and significant relationship between firm value and 
the advertising ratio as well as the return to capital. A negative and significant relationship is reported 
between firm value and the dispersion of analyst forecasts. Security analyst following is negatively 
associated with the debt ratio, but positively and significantly associated with the advertising ratio, the 
R&D ratio, and the trading volume. 
 
TABLE 3 
3SLS REGRESSION OF SECURITY ANALYST MONITORING AND FIRM  
VALUE BY FIRM SIZE 
 
Panel A: Quartile 1 
Variable NAN 
Coefficient 
NAN 
t-Statistics 
Tobin’s q 
Coefficient 
Tobin’s q 
t-Statistics 
ln (NAN)     1.4783 5.16*** 
ln (q) 0.1809 1.73     
Debt Ratio -0.0031 -0.07 -0.0092 -0.13 
Advert Ratio -0.0339 -0.01 1.0203 0.24 
R&D Ratio 0.8547 0.74 -1.6787 -0.97 
1/Share Price 0.3564 0.38     
ln (Dispersion)     -0.0505 -2.73*** 
ln (Return Variance) 0.0033 0.48     
ln (Trading Volume) 0.1130 2.57***     
Return to Capital     3.8846 5.02*** 
ln (Firm Size) 0.1806 1.91* -0.4194 -3.26*** 
ln (Shareholders)     -0.0491 -1.08 
SOX -0.0950 -3.05*** 0.1342 2.83*** 
Adjusted R2 0.09       
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Panel B: Quartile 2 
Variable NAN 
Coefficient 
NAN 
t-Statistics 
Tobin’s q 
Coefficient 
Tobin’s q 
t-Statistics 
ln (NAN)     1.5651 1.69* 
ln (q) 0.9708 4.28*     
Debt Ratio -0.0438 -1.00 0.0063 0.08 
Advert Ratio -2.1523 -0.88 5.699 1.34 
R&D Ratio -0.4750 -0.23 0.2691 0.08 
1/Share Price 2.1671 1.98**     
ln (Dispersion)     -0.0440 -1.15 
ln (Return Variance) 0.0142 2.17**     
ln (Trading Volume) 0.1517 2.88***     
Return to Capital     2.4192 1.47 
ln (Firm Size) 0.4610 4.46*** -0.3091 -2.02** 
ln (Shareholders)     -0.0370 -0.67 
SOX -0.0935 -2.76*** 0.2169 1.70* 
Adjusted R2 0.08       
 
Panel C: Quartile 3 
Variable NAN 
Coefficient 
NAN 
t-Statistics 
Tobin’s q 
Coefficient 
Tobin’s q 
t-Statistics 
ln (NAN)     0.6427 2.29** 
ln (q) 0.4170 2.79***     
Debt Ratio -0.0770 -2.51*** 0.0186 0.54 
Advert Ratio 9.3005 4.44*** 7.2853 2.30** 
R&D Ratio 2.6569 2.19** -0.7919 -0.65 
1/Share Price -1.1094 -1.54     
ln (Dispersion)     -0.0067 -0.65 
ln (Return Variance) 0.0001 0.01     
ln (Trading Volume) 0.1081 2.90***     
Return to Capital     3.7538 8.87*** 
ln (Firm Size) 0.2496 4.21*** -0.0348 3.52*** 
ln (Shareholders)     0.0812 1.94* 
SOX -0.0967 -3.76*** 0.0338 1.88* 
Adjusted R2 0.09       
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Panel D: Quartile 4 
Variable NAN 
Coefficient 
NAN 
t-Statistics 
Tobin’s q 
Coefficient 
Tobin’s q 
t-Statistics 
ln (NAN)     0.1296 1.88* 
ln (q) 0.3884 2.90***     
Debt Ratio -0.0810 -2.84*** -0.0075 -0.33 
Advert Ratio 3.7062 2.33*** 3.0977 2.77*** 
R&D Ratio 1.955 1.94* -0.6434 -0.88 
1/Share Price -0.5607 -0.69     
ln (Dispersion)     -0.0173 -3.27*** 
ln (Return Variance) 0.0024 0.65     
ln (Trading Volume) 0.1130 4.38***     
Return to Capital     3.7097 11.79*** 
ln (Firm Size) 0.0139 0.30 0.0035 0.12 
ln (Shareholders)     0.0805 2.67*** 
SOX -0.0439 -2.31** 0.0582 3.66*** 
Adjusted R2 0.12       
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level in two-tailed tests. 
  ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level in two-tailed tests. 
    * Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level in two-tailed tests. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study investigates the effect of SOX on security analyst monitoring activity and firm value, 
seeking evidence on whether security analyst following has changed post-SOX and the effect (if any) on 
the traditional positive two-way relationship between security analyst following and firm value (Tobin’s 
q). Moreover, the complementary monitoring role played by SOX is examined to determine its effect on 
firm value. We use a simultaneous equation 3SLS method to conduct the tests. 
The evidence presented supports the view that security analyst monitoring activity has changed post-
SOX. In fact, findings indicate that there has been a decrease in security analyst after SOX was 
implemented, even though an increase in firm value was recorded during the same time period. This 
suggests that the traditional positive bidirectional association between analyst following and firm value 
has changed because of the additional monitoring activity that SOX provides in the financial markets. In 
much the same way that bond covenants reduce the need for security analysts monitoring activity, the 
legislation (SOX) can be deemed a covenant, or a complementary monitoring mechanism, governing all 
internal aspects of public firms, likewise reducing the need for security analyst monitoring. In essence, a 
bond covenant restricts an issuer’s activities and aims to maintain financial prudence, which is similar to 
SOX’s emphasis on better corporate governance, accurate financial disclosure and minimizing fraudulent 
behavior. Therefore, SOX motivates managers and their firms to be efficient leading to a decrease in 
agency costs and in turn, a decrease in security analyst monitoring activity. 
The findings in this study also support the view that SOX has had a positive impact on firm value. 
Critics of the legislation have always highlighted the high costs of compliance and the burdensome nature 
of SOX itself as obstacles to any potential benefits. They are of the view that SOX would hinder 
innovation, risk taking and productivity stunting economic growth in the process. However, this study 
finds support for an increase in firm value for every firm in the sample. 
The potential effect of SOX on small firms has been somewhat difficult for academicians and 
practitioners alike to analyze. On one hand, some believed that the compliance costs of SOX would be too 
great for these small firms to realize any benefits. Conversely, others believe that SOX will go a long way 
in making these small firms more efficient. The results of this study indicate that SOX has had a positive 
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impact on the firm value of small firms. Moreover, the increase in firm value for small firms has 
increased by a greater percentage than the increase for the group of larger firms. This gives credence to 
the view that smaller firms may actually benefit more from SOX than larger firms because of the 
increased transparency that these small firms enjoy post-SOX. 
Overall, this body of research is consistent with the view that all monitoring activity, whether it is 
directly through security analysts and financial institutions, or indirectly through bond covenants and 
legislation such as SOX, plays a key role in increasing firm value.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
2.  See Pindyck and Rubenfeld (1997) for a thorough discussion on simultaneous equations and endogeneity. 
3.  Schaffer, M.E., 2007. xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML 
and k-class regression for panel data models. http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html. 
4.  See Modigliani and Miller (1958) for their seminal research on capital structure and firm value. 
5.  Data is obtained from The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) 
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